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IS THE CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS DEVISING
REAL ESTATE GOVERNED BY THE RULES
OF CONSTRUCTION OF THE DOMICIL- OF
THE TESTATOR OR BY THE RULES OF THE
SITUS OF THE PROPERTY?
There is a deep-rooted and widespread opinion among
legal practitioners that the construction of a will of real
estate is determined according to the rule of the situs and
not according to the law of the domicil.
Having entertained for some time this opinion in common with others of the profession I was compelled a few
months ago to examine the authorities on the question closely
and I found that the contrary of this opinion was expressed
by two text writers on the Conflict of Laws-one the
most recent writer on that subject and the other probably
the most venerated in the Uiited States. On turning to the
most recent work on the Conflict of Laws,' I found the following discussion of the subject:
'Conflict

6f Laws; or Private International Law, by Raleigh C.

Minor, M. A., B. L, Professor of Law in the University of Virginia.
Boston: Little, Brown & Co., igo.

Page 341.
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"If the property disposed of be land situated in a
state other than the. testator's domicil, some question
has been made whether the interpretation of the testator's language should be controlled by the law and
usage of the domicil or of the situs of the property. A
few cases may be found holding that the interpretation of the devise must depend upon the lex situs. But
here too the weight of reason and atithority is in favor
of the rule that the interpretation of a devise is to be
governed by the law of usage with which the testator
is supposed to be most familiar, namely, that of his
domicil; and hence when he uses words he must be priesumed to have' intended that they should be used
in the sense given them in his domicil, unless the contrary appears." 2
On turning to Story on the Conflict of Laws3 with that
confidence which his name generally inspires, I found the
following discussion of the law governing the construction
of "Wills of Immovables :"
"The same rules of construction (i. e., the same that
apply to wills and testaments of personal property) 4
will generally apply to wills and testaments of immovable property, unless indeed it can be clearly gathered
from the terms used in the will, that the testator had in
view the law of the place of the situs, or used other language, which necessarily referred to the usages and
customs, or language appropriate only to that situs."5
Now in the particular case under my consideration, the
testator made his will in Maryland and had used no language from which it could possibly be inferred that he "hlad
in view the law of the place of the situs (Pennsylvania) or
used other language, which necessarily referred to the usages
and customs or language appropriate only to that situs.".
Mr. Bigelow, the latest annotator of Story, has printed in
v. Ford, So Mich. 42, i8go; Ford v. Ford, 7o Wis. i9,
Wis. 621, i88; Proctdrv. Clark, 154 Mass. 45, i8g; Lincoln v. Perry, 149 Mass. 368, I889.
' Story's Conflict of Laws, 8th ed., p. 671.
' See same volume, p. 663.
' Citing Trotter v. Trotter, 4 Bligh. N. S. 502, 1828.
'CitingFord

1887; s. c. 72
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the Eighth Edition6 a hote to the same effect as Story's text,
citing both modem and early cases. Mr. Bigelowv in his
preface to this edition gives Mr. J. L. Thorndike, of the
Boston Bar, the credit for writing this note, of which the
following portion should be quoted here:
"The rule that a will is to be interpreted according
to the law of the testator's domicil, is not limited to
dispositions of his personal estate but seems to apply
in all cases, except where it appears that he expressed
his meaning with reference to the law of some other
place.7 For example, in cases where a will is*inoperative as to real estate in a foreign country, and the question is whether the testator has expressed an intention
to dispose of it which will put the heir to his election,
the interpretation is governed, not by the law of the
foreign country where the real estate is, but by the law
of the testator's domicil."8'
Mr. Thorndike concedes that "a disposition of property in the technical forms of a foreign law will in some
cases show an intention that it is to be construed according
to that law. ' 9 But this, says Mr. Thorndike, is not so
unless the devise is in the technical form of a foreign law.
He says:
"Perhaps a specific disposition of real estate in a foreign
country separately from other property may be prestimed
to have been made with -reference to the law of that
country, and ,ihay therefore be interpreted according to that
law.' 0 . But no such presumption can arise where a testator makes a general disposition of all his property or all his
real estate. In such a case the question being simply one of
the intention expressed in the will, and not of the validity of
the disposition it is evident that the words express the same
'Pages 650-651.
'Citing Trotter v. Trotter, 4 Bligh. N. S. 502, 1828; Wallis v. Brightwell, 2 P. W. 88, 1722; Maxwell v. Maxwell, L. R. 4 H. L. 5o6, i87o;
Caulfield v. Sullivan, 85 N. Y. 153, 1881.
aCiting Trotter v. Trotter, 4 Bligh. N. S. 502 1828; Maxwell v.
Maxwell, 2 D. M. & G. 705, 1852; Orrell v. Orrell, L. R. 6 Ch. 302, 1871.
9 Citing Chamberlain v. Napier, 15 Ch. D. 614, i88o; Mitchell v.
Scotch Ct. Sess. Cas. Fourth Series, vol. iii, p. 208, 1875.
Davies,
' 0 Citing Yates v. Thompson,.3 C1. &.F. at p. 588, 1835.
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intention as to all the property or real estate wherever it
may be. They ought not therefore to be interpreted even in
the case of real estate so as to have different meanings in the
different countries where the lands may be.1
This has
sometimes been done, however, but, as it is submitted, by a
misapplication of the rule that the validity and forms of

transfers of real estate are governed by the lex situs.12

When the question is whether a general gift shows an intention to dispose of property over which the testator has a
power of appointment, and which is subject to the law, of a
foreign country, it cannot be said that the gift should be
interpreted according to the foreign law because it takes
effect under that law, for the object of the interpretation is
to ascertain whether it takes effect or riot. It cannot be
said that it should be interpreted according to the law of any
place where there may be property which the testator has
power to dispose of, for then the same words would in
Massachusetts show that he intended to exercise all his
powers of appointment, and in Maryland would not show
that he intended to exercise any. Resort must be had in
sucr cases to the law of the place in the language of which
the testator would probably have expressed his meaning.
The authorities seem to establish that that law is the law
of the country in which he was domiciled. it is submitted,
therefore, with deference, that in each of these two cases13
the will should have been interpreted according .to the
domicil of the testatoi who made the will in question, and
not of the testator who made the will containing the power.
If this had been done, the will in Bingham's Appeal, would
have disclosed an intention to dispose of all property which"
the testator had a general power to appoint by will, and
would have been effectual as an execution of the power.
No intention to execute any power 'of appointment would
'Citing Crusoe v. Butler, 36 Miss: I5o, 1858; Wilson v. Cox, 49 Miss.
s38, 1873, 545; Studd v. Studd, Scotch Ct. Sess. Cas. Fourth Series,
vol. viii, P. 29, 188o.
Citing Applegate v. Smith, 31 Mo. x66, i86o; fennings v. Jennings,
21 Ohio St 56, 1871.
Citing Bingham's Appeal, 64"Pa. St 345, 187o; Sewall v. Wilmer,
132 Mass. 131, 1882.

RULES GOVERNING CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS.

627

have been found in the"will in Sewall v. Wilimer, and accordingly the will would have had no effect as an execution of
the power."
Finding therefore that the opinion of two text writers
was opposed to the opinion which I found lawyers generally
entertained on this question, I nattirally turned to the authorities on which these text writers based their views and
examined with interest the reasons and authorities relied on
by them. Other text writers I found had reached an opposite
conclusion to that of Story and Minor.14 In view of this
conflict of text writers an examination and analysis of the
decisions in England and America became necessary.'
The object of this paper is to give the result of this examination and to state what I believe to be the rule derived
from reason and authority.
CLASSIFICATION

OF CASES.

The question of course has arisen from time to time (I)
in courts of the domicil, (2) in courts of the situs; (3)in,
the courts of a third sovereignty.
A classification of the cases on this basis will I think aid
the discussion hereafter. With this classification in mind
we naturally inquire:
I. Have courts of the domicil enforced their own law or
that of the situs in construing wills of foreign realty?
2. Have courts of the situs enforced their own law or
that of the foreign domicil of the testator in construing foreign wills devising realty within their jurisdiction?
3. Have the courts of a third sovereignty enforced the
law of the domicil or the law of the situs?
I. WILLS OF FOREIGN REALTY CONS'TRUED BY THE COURT

OF THE DOmICIL.

The case of Trotter v: Trotter,1 5 is undoubtedly the foundation of Story's opinion that the lex domiciiii governs, be"Dicey on the Conflict of Laws, p. 528; Wharton on the Conflict of
Laws, sec. 597; Redfield on Wills, vol. i,p. 398 and p. 4o9; Jarman onl
Wills, 6th ed., vol. i, p. x.
154 Bligh. N. S. 502, 1828.
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cause it is cited by Story as the authority for his proposition.1
There is no doubt that the opinion of Lord Lyndhurst, Lord Chancellor, abounds with dicta in support of
Story's view, but a careful consideration of the case shows
that it is not an authority for his statement.
The testator domiciled in India devised to his executors in
Scotland the residue of his estate in India, who "were thereby
instructed to divide the remainder of his- estate as they
received it from India and the whole of his property in
Europe into six equal shares to be paid share and share alike,
to each of his brothers and sisters." Previously, the testator had remitted money to Scotland which under his direction had been invested, in Scotch heritable bonds, which
under Scotch law were real estate and passed to the heir at
law of the creditor and not to his personal representative.
The oldest brother of the testator claimed the bonds as
heir at law and also claimed one-sixth of the personal estate
under the will. By the law of Scotland the bonds could not
pass by the will even if such had been the expressed intention of Charles Trotter because the will lacked the technical
words necessary to devise real estate. The question then
was whether the heir at law could take his share of tie personalty and also inherit the bonds (i. e., the real estate) or
whether the intention of the testator to devis4 the real estate,
though ineffectually declared, put the heir at law to his
election. "A case was stated for the opinion of English
counsel upon the question whether Trotter (the heir at law)
was bound to elect." On their report the Scottish Court of
Session held that the heir was not put to an election under
the will.
It was assumed by the Court and the counsel, but without
the slightest considerationof the question, that the lex domicilii was the proper rule of construction, both as to the per-'
sonalty and as to the real estate devised by the will.
But the point on which the decision actually turned was
that there was no satisfactoty evidence "that it was the
intention of the testatorto dispose by his will of the heritable
bonds."
In other words the Court proceeds to give judgment for
" Story's Conflict of Laws, 8th ed., p. 672.
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the heir at law as to the bonds, not on the ground that the
bonds are real estate and that by the law of England, if not
of Scotland, he is not put to an election, but on the ground
that the will does not devise any real estate at all. "The
question," says the Lord Chancellor,1 7 "was therefore simply
a question of construction. Does it appear upon the face
of the will that it was the intention of the testator to dispose
of his real estate, that is, of those heritable bonds? Now
the rule of law*in England with respect to subjects of this
kind is well ascertained and well defined and it is this, that
you are not to proceed by probability of by conjecture but
that there must be a clear and manifest expressiori of the
intention on the face of the will, to include that property
which is not properly devised, before the heir can be put to
his election."
In determining this "question of construction" as to
whether the will covered the heritable bonds, the House of
Lords does not appear to have had recourse to the law of
England or the law of Scotland but to the mere language of
the testator.
All that Trotter v. Trotter decides is, therefore, that
Charles Trotter did not express any intention to devise his
Scottish heritable bonds. There was no conflict of laws. It
is not suggested that by the law of Scotland the heir was
put to election in cases where facts existed similar to those
in Trotter v. Trotter.
Professor Minor has also cited Trotter v. Trotter,1 7 a but
it is easy to show that he has totally misunderstood that
case. He says :17b "The Scotch law required an heir claiming also personal property under the will either to throw his
heritage into the common fund and take his legacy or to elect
between the two." . . . "It was held that the terms of
the will must be construed according to the laws of England and that by the law of England the terms used were
not such as to import an intention to transfer any real estate
of the testator; that the law of England did not require a
Page 507.
1Ta P- 343.
1Tb P. 343.
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legatee who was also heir to throw his inherited lands into
hotch-pot or else to elect."
The error consists in the statement- that there was no
doctrine of election under the law of England. But in the
portion of the opinion just above quoted it appears that the
English law did recognize the doctrine of election: "There
must," said Lord Lyndhurst, "be a clear and manifest expression of the intention on the face of the will to include
that property which is not properly devised, before the
heir can be put to his election." There is not the slightest
reason for the assertion that the law of England was in any
respect different from the law of Scotland as to any matter
at issue in Trotter v. Trotter.
To the supposed authority of Trotter v. Trotter, Story's
Annotator, Mr. Bigelow, has added some other citations.
Of these Enohin v. Wylie48 is utterly irrelevant, as the case
relates solely to personal properiy-"funds in England."
This blunder of Bigelow's has been followed by the American and English Encyclopedia of Law,1 9 where Enohin v.
Wylie is cited as relating to real estate. Chamberlain v.
Napier2 is next cited by Bigelow, but the case does not prove
Story's contention. In that case a marriage contract, relating to English realty, made in Scotland, was construed
according to the law of England. The Court said: "The
adoption of an English form of trusts ordinarily found in
English Settlements, and of powers according to the law of
England are circumstances favorable to the view that the
settlement should, as regards the husband's property, be construed as being an English Settlement."
The final citation of Bigel6w to Story's text is Bible
Society v. Pendleton,2 ° a but in that case the testator conveyed
away Pennsylvania land by deed in his lifetime, directing
that the grantee should sell the land and hold the proceeds
subject to the written order of the grantor, who subsequently
devised the said proceeds by will. The Court held that the
law of the testator's domicil and not the law of Pennsylvania
i IO H. L Cases I, 1862.
"Vol. iii, p. 637.

15 Ch. Div. 614, 88o.

2o

a 7 W. Va. 79, 1873.
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determined the validity of the devise. The case has obviously no application here, as there was plainly an equitable
conversion.
Wallis v. Brightwell21 is cited by Mr. Thorndike (in the
note to Story's Conflict of Laws which I have above referred
to2 2 ) as authority for the view that the lex domicilii governs
when there is a conflict of law. This case, however, though
it is a decision of the English Court of Chancery rendered
by Lord Macclesfield is no authority for either side in the
question under discussion. The testator domiciled in England at the making of his will devised his lands inIreland
to a trustee "in trust out of the rents and profits to pay
£8o per annum to his wife for life." The only question was
whether, the testator meant English or Irish pounds. The
Court held that as the will was made in England and all the
parties lived in England "it cannot be conceived, that the testator thought'of sending his wife every year to Ireland to
fetch her annuity," and that English pounds was meant.
Here plainly there was no conflict of laws whatever, the only
question was the meaning of the word pounds. If the Irish'
law of real estate had declared that the word "pounds"
occurring in wills of Irish land always must be construed
to mean Irish pounds, while the English law had declared
that the word "pounds" in all wills construed in English
courts must be taken to mean English pounds then there
would have been a question. in the Conflict of Laws.
Maxwell v.. Maxwell2" is also cited in Mr. Thorndike's
note to Story,2 4 but no question of the conflict of laws
arose in this case.- The only question was whether a debt
which had been created by the testator by giving a heritable
bond on his Scotch estate of Glenlee was to remain a charge
on that estate in the hands of a son to whom he had previously devised that property by a Scotch testamentary instrument, or whether, under the terms of his English will
made subsequent to the testamentary instrument, the English
plersonal estate should be applied in exoneration of the debt
2

P. W. 88,

"1See p. 625.

1722.

2

'L.R. 4 H. L. 5o6, x87o.

" See ante p. 625.
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under a direction contained in the English will (which was
made subsequent to. the disposition of Glenlee) that the
devises and provisions of his will should be construed so as
not in any manner to affect his Glenlee estate. This will
directed his trustees to pay out of the residuum "all my just
debts and funeral and testamentary expenses." The heritable bond on Glenlee was given after the execution of the
English will. The House of Lords held that the residuum
must exonerate Glenlee.
Mr. Thorndike's note also cites as an authority the case of
Caulfield v. Sullivan.25 In that case a testator living in
France but a citizen of New York devised all his real and
personal estate to the plaintiff "on condition that she execute
the disposition hereinafter contained." "The testator left
real and personal property both in France and the United
States." The disposition above referred to was a devise of
all property "situated on the continent of America to my
brothers." The plaintiff having accepted the provisions of
the will in her favor by taking all the property in France
was not permitted to assert a claim against the estate in this
country. There is difficulty in finding any conflict of laws in
this case, as the plaintiff, who appeared as a creditor-of the
estate, in America, was held to have been put to an election. If the case implies that under the French law the
plaintiff's title to the French real estate did not depend on
her relinquishing all claims against the estate in America,
but that she might claim both under and against the will at
the same time, the reply seems sufficient that the court of
the domicil could impose what to it seemed an equitable
condition as to the assertion of her claim here for a sum of
money without in any way conflicting with the French law
of real estate.
Maxwell v. Maxwell.2 6 This case is also cited as an authority by Mr. Thorndike, in his note to Story, but it is not
an authority in favor of the doctrine he maintains. The
case was in Chancery. The testator domiciled in England
owned three heritable bonds for sums charged upon lands
in Scotland (which bonds were real estate by the law of
S85 N. Y. 153, 1881.

"2 De Gex McN. & G. 705, 1852.
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Scotland and passed to. the heir) also English estates and
certain personal property. He devised and bequeathed "all
my real and personal estate whatsoever and wheresoever
and whether in possession or reversion upon trust," etc.
The will did not in the words of devise contain the word
"dispone" which is essential to a valid disposition of real
estate in Scotland and also lacked the clause of attestation
which was essential to a valid disposition of real estate in
Scotland. The question was whether the defendant was
compelled to elect to take either a share under the will in
both the personal estate and the Scottish estate or the Scottish estate without the will, or whether on the other hand
he was entitled to take the benefits under the will and also
to take as the heir at law the Scotch estate in the heritable
bonds. The Master of the Rolls, Sir John Romilly, decided
that the heir was not put to an election. The Court of
Chancery, Knight Bruce, L. J., and Cranworth, L. J., dismissed the appeal from that decision.
Bruce, J. L.: "The will is of unquestionable invalidity
as to the real estate in Scotland, which, accordingly has
descended on one of the testator's children as his heir according to the law of Scotland

.

.

if he has specially

mentioned property not capable of being so given, the case
is not. the same; as here, if the testator had mentioned
Scotland in terms, or had not had any other real estate than
real estate in Scotland there, might have been ground for
putting the heir.to his election. The matter, however, standing as it does, we are, as it seems to me, bound to hold that
the will before us does not exhibit an intention to give or to
affect any property that the will was not adapted to pass."
Orrell v. Orrel2 7 is also cited in the note of Mr. Thorndike to Story. But the case is one where the heir at law of
Scotch estates, which had been devised "upon trust to sell
my said real estate," (i. e. in any part of Great Britain or
elsewhere) was put to an election, the will being "inoperative to pass the Scotch estate."
Such a case, I submit, does not. raise a conflict of laws at
all as the court of the domicil does not pretend to hold that
the will i operative, as to the real estate.
L. R. 6 Chancery Appeals, 302, i87i.
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The court of the domicil recognizes that the heir at'law
has a perfect title to the real estate under the foreign law,
but refuses to allow him to aisserf that itile against the will
and at the same time claim under the will in the court of
the domicil.
Thus in Maxwell v. Maxwell,2 above cited, the court
held that the heir at law was not put to an election, and in
Orrell v. Orrell they held that he was put to an election
The ground of the .decisions was that in one case the court
construed the will to express such an intention as to the
Scotch lands that the heir ought not to defeat that intention
by claiming against the will and at the same time under it;
in the other case the court held that no such intention was
expressed as put the heir to an election.
These cases on election cannot be regarded as proper
evidence to establish the contention of Story because the
question of election in the court of the domicil is of necessity a question concerning the right to personal property
under a will devising both personal property and foreign
real estate.
The heir at law's title to the real estate under the foreign
law may be perfect because of the informality of the devise.
The court of the domicil does not attempt to say that the law
of the situs is not binding as to the real estate in the court of
the domicil so long as the heir at law is content to be merely
the heir at law. But the court of the domicil without
attempting to deny the application of that foreign lex rei
sitae may say to the heir at law, you shall not come into this
court as a legatee of personal property of the testator, or of
funds arising from the sale of his real estate and thus clairh
under his will unless you surrender your rights as heir at
law. It is submitted that the cases on election used by Mr.
Thorndike to establish his theory ate therefore not in point
at all.
To create a conflict of laws in such a case it would be
necessary to have a rule in the court of the situs as to the
election of the heir at law exactly the opposite of the rule
of the court of the domicil. The court of the domicil would
252

De Gex, McN. & G. 7o5, 1852.
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then be compelled to enforce either their own rule as to the
election of the heir at law of real estate or the rule of the
situs. But in such an event it is difficult to see how the rule
could be regarded as anything but a rule as to the construction and enforcement- of wills of personal property.
In Van Dyke's Appeal,2 9 a case not cited by Mr. Thordike or Mr. Bigelow, the true character of an enforced equitable election in relation to a foreign law. is shown in an important decision in which the opinion was delivered by Sharswood, J.
A testator domiciled in Pennsylvania devised lands in
New Jersey to his sons in equal shares, and gave his daughters pecuniary legacies.
The will, having no subscribing witnesses, was ineffectual
to pass title to the sons in the New Jersey lands. They therefore filed a bill against the daughters.. "The prayer is that
the daughters may be put to their election, either to give
effect to the whole will, by relinquishing their claim upon the
New Jersey property or from their legacies to compensate
the sons for their loss in consequence of the daughters sharing with them the New Jersey property."
The Court said: "The case before us is of a will duly
executed according to the laws of Pennsylvania, devising
lands in New Jersey where, however, it is invalid as to the
realty by not having two subscribing witnesses. A court
of New Jersey might hold themselves on these authorities
bound to shut their eyes to the devise of the realty and consider it as though it were not written.

.

.

.

But a

statute of New Jersey has no such moral power over the
conscience of a court of Pennsylvania to prevent it from
reading the whole will upon the construction of a bequest
of personalty within its rightful jurisdiction. If a question
could arise directly upon the title of the heirs at law to the
New Jersey land, doubtless the court of any other state,
upon the well settled principles of the comity of nations,
must decide it according to the lex rei sitae. We are dealing only with the bequests of personalty, and the simple
question is, whether the testator intended to annex to them
a condition."
"6o Pa. St. 481, x869..
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The American and English Encyclopedia of Law 0 follows Story and says: "The law of the domicil of the testator governs in the construction of a will disposing of real
property, unless the testator had in view the law of the
situs, or uses language necessarily referring to the usages
and customs, and appropriate only to that situs."
The citations include Trotter v. Trotter which we have
already considered, and Enohin v. Wyli'e, the latter case
not relating to real estate at all. The author of this article
had evidently close at hand the Bigelow-Thorndike annotations to Story.
The case of Dannelli v. Dannelli,3 1 cited by the American
and English Encycloledia has no application whatever to
the question at issue for the opinion states that "in this
case, the law of both the testator's domicil and situs regard
A. as a legitimate child and heir"-which legitimacy was
the question. Under the laws of Italy where the legatee
lived, the legatee was .not legitimate. This case is like the
one above,3 2 where the question Was, in what sense did the
testator use the word "pounds?" In Dannelli v. Dannelli
the Court held that by the word heir in a Kentucky will was
meant heir according to the Kentucky law.
The case of Lincoln v. Perry,3 3 is also cited by Mr. Minor
to sustain his theory, but the case decides nothing whatever
to support his contention.
Plaintiff was a trustee of New Hampshire lands, which
had been sold under order of Court in that state. The
Massachusetts Court refused to give directions as to anything but personalty on a bill-for direction.
The Court said:
"These questions so far as we are called upon to
deal with them relate only to the disposition which the
trustee is to make of the personal estate given by the
residuary devise. There was no real estate in Massa30Ist edition, vol. iii, p. 367. Citing Dainelli v. Dannelli, 4 Bush. 62
Ky. 1868; Enohin v. Wylie, io H. L. Cas. I, 1862; Trotter v. Trotter, 3
W]is. & Sh.407; s. C. 4 Bligh, N. S. 502, 505, 1828.
214 Bush. 62, Ky. 1868.
' Wallis v. Brightell, 2 Peere Williams, 88, 1722.

149 Mass. 368, i889.
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chusetts which was included in the .residuary devise.
The plaintiff, having been appointed trustee in New
Hampshire for the purpose of selling the land there
situated, -and having made sale of it accordingly, will
account for his disposition of the proceeds of such
sale in the courts of that state.
The Court then said that the expression "heirs at law"
to whom the testator devised the residue of his estate was
to be determined by the law of his domicil, but the Court
here disposed of nothing but the testdtor's personal estate.
In Ford v. Ford,34 a bill was brought to construe a will.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin recognized the rule
against perpetuities of Missouri and ignored the rule of Wisconsin and Michigan, where the land lay in Michigan and

was to be sold and invested in lands in Missouri.
"It follows," says the Court, "that the validity of
the proposed conversion of personal property into lands
in Kansas City must be determined by the laws and
courts of Missouri."
This case is cited by Mr. Minor 34a in support of his
contention that the interpretation of a devise is to be governed by the law or usage of the domicil. But the case
proves nothing of the kind. Here the Court of the domicil
refused to enforce its own iaw as to perpetuities, but left
that question to be settled by the Court of the situs.
In Ford v. Ford,35 there was an equitable conversion.
The former dcreesGa was followed. Although the opinion
contains a dictum that the construction of the domiciliary
Court must control as to realty yet the basis of the decision
is the doctrine of equitable conversion, i. e., that there were
really no lands in Michigan. The case then cites as authority
for the dictum that "the meaning and intent of the testator
having been settled by the domiciliary Court, the courts in
foreign states and countries will be guided by such construc0 Boyes v. Bedale,3s
tion ;" the cases of Trotter v. Trotter,"
Z470 Wis. i9,1887.
a P. 341.
'So Mich. 42, i8go.
33a 7o Wisconsin, ig.
Z4 Bligh (N. S.) 5o2 discussed supra.

S74 Hem. & Miller, 7o8, 1863:
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which related only to personalty, and only decided that
"child" did not mean an illegitimate, but subsequently legitimated child, though such child could take under a Will made
in France.
3
In this connection note also that Brown v. Br-,wn, 8
applies only to personalty and is erroneously cited by
Minor,3 8a

as relating to real estate.

The conclusion, therefore, is that in no case aoove cited
by these text writers has a Court of the testator's domicil,
when construing a will devising foreign real estate construed that will in violation of a rule of construction cr law
of the Courts of the situs.
Crawford D. Henng.
(To be concluded in December number.)

834
W'a

Wils & Shaw, 28, 1830.
P. 342.

